The dust has settled on the New Patriotic Party’s recent presidential primary, yet the atmosphere remains thick with unresolved questions. While the election of Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia as flagbearer for the 2028 contest set a historic precedent, the mechanism of his victory, the entrenched delegate system, though expanded for the 2026 primary, has once again become a lightning rod for criticism. Some pundits and political commentators say the process is too exclusive, too transactional, and fundamentally disconnects the party’s leadership from its grassroots base. The clamour for change is loud, with many calling the expansion of the voting franchise to all card-bearing members as the ultimate democratic remedy. Yet, this seductive proposal may be little more than a cosmetic fix, obscuring the deeper, systemic rot that truly threatens internal party democracy.
The current frustration with the delegate system is entirely justifiable. For decades, internal party primaries in Ghana have been characterized by what is euphemistically termed the cocoa season for delegates—a period where a select few executives at the polling station, constituency, and regional levels become the targets of intense, often illicit, financial courting by desperate aspirants. The optics of candidates distributing cash, under the thin guise of transportation reimbursement or feeding and refreshment, create an undeniable perception of an auction house rather than a marketplace of ideas. When the power to choose a potential Head of State rests in the hands of a few thousand amenable individuals, the temptation to buy influence is not just risky; it becomes an inevitability of political arithmetic.
Faced with this monetized status quo, the argument for broadening the electorate appears, on the surface, indisputable. The logic suggests that while a wealthy candidate might successfully bribe 200,000 delegates, it is mathematically and logistically impossible to bribe two million card-bearing members. Therefore, proponents argue, expanding the voting rights—moving toward a One Member, One Vote system—would naturally dilute the power of moneybags and return the party to its true owners. This perspective views the current constitutional restriction, which limits voting rights to established officers in good standing, as an aristocratic barrier that must be torn down in the name of populism.
However, assuming that quantity automatically equates to integrity is a dangerous gamble. Corruption in Ghanaian politics is notoriously pervasive and highly adaptable; like a river, it will find its way to sea regardless of the terrain. Expanding the voter pool does not eliminate the need for massive campaign funds; it merely shifts how those funds are deployed. Instead of targeting specific delegates, candidates would simply pivot to wholesale inducement. The costs would migrate from direct cash handouts to massive mobilization efforts, media saturation, and the hiring of armies of agents on the ground to secure votes through subtler forms of patronage. The barrier to entry for a cash-strapped but competent candidate would remain insurmountably high.
Furthermore, simply throwing open the doors to all card-bearing members introduces its own set of paradoxes that threaten party cohesion. The current NPP constitution emphasizes members in good standing—those who pay dues and actively work for the party. Opponents may call this a “pay-to-play” barrier, but defenders will argue it ensures that those making crucial decisions have skin in the game. Removing these guardrails to allow every nominal member—many of whom may not be in good standing—to vote risks diluting the influence of committed party members and opens the door to infiltration by opposition elements seeking to sabotage the primary by electing the weakest candidate. A massive, unvetted electorate might be more democratic in raw numbers, but it is not necessarily more loyal, informed, or principled.
The uncomfortable truth is that tinkering with the size of the electorate is merely rearranging deckchairs on a ship leaking from the hull. The existential threat to Ghana’s internal party democracy is not who is voting, but the completely unregulated ecosystem of how the pursuit of those votes is funded. Until the conversation shifts aggressively toward robust political finance reform, any structural change will be meaningless. The current legal framework allows candidates to raise and spend astronomical sums in the dark, creating a culture where political office is viewed as an investment requiring a financial return, fuelling national corruption cycles.
The true antidote to the highest bidder mentality lies in empowering the Electoral Commission with the legal teeth and forensic capacity to police internal party spending. This requires a new legislative paradigm where transparency is mandatory, not optional. We need laws that compel candidates in primaries to disclose donors above a certain threshold and, crucially, to adhere to strict expenditure caps monitored by independent auditors. Until a candidate fears legal repercussions for obscuring their funding sources more than they fear losing an election, the size of the delegate pool is irrelevant. True democracy is not just about counting every vote; it is about ensuring that no vote is bought.
Credit: Critical Analysis of Governance Issues, February 2-7, 2026


