Shaping Ghana’s 2026 Budget: Pathways for Fiscal Consolidation and Growth

The World Bank’s 9th Ghana Economic Update [1]makes it clear that one of Ghana’s deepest economic challenges lies in its labour market. At first glance, Ghana’s growth record over the past two decades looks impressive: between 2009 and 2019, the economy expanded at an average annual rate of nearly 7 percent, lifting incomes above the Sub-Saharan African average and reducing poverty. Yet beneath these headline numbers, the jobs story has been far less encouraging. Growth has been concentrated in capital-intensive sectors like oil, mining, and financial services, which generate few employment opportunities, while the majority of workers remain stuck in low-productivity agriculture or informal trade.

The Bank identifies five interrelated challenges at the heart of Ghana’s labour market problem. First, the economy is simply not generating jobs fast enough to match population growth. Second, productive sectors such as manufacturing and modern services remain too small, leaving most workers concentrated in subsistence agriculture or petty trading. Third, there is a growing mismatch between education and employment. More young Ghanaians are completing secondary and tertiary education, but the economy is not producing sufficient skilled jobs to absorb them, eroding the returns to education. Fourth, labour mobility is weak: even when people switch occupations, they often remain trapped in the same low-productivity categories, with little upward movement into more productive work. Finally, women face disproportionate barriers, as they are overrepresented in the least productive sectors, earn less than men, and encounter structural challenges in moving up the economic ladder.

To break this cycle, the World Bank calls for a comprehensive jobs and growth strategy that goes beyond stabilization. At its core, such a strategy requires investing in both physical and human capital. This means improving infrastructure such as energy, irrigation, and transport while simultaneously upgrading the quality of education and training, particularly in technical and digital skills that can prepare young people for the future of work. It also requires tackling long-standing inefficiencies in state-owned enterprises, many of which absorb scarce resources without delivering productivity gains, and redirecting those resources to job-creating sectors.

Equally important is creating a more supportive environment for private enterprise. Ghanaian firms, especially in manufacturing and agro-processing, face high costs of finance, land access challenges, regulatory bottlenecks, and unfair competition from informality. Addressing these constraints would allow businesses to expand and create more jobs. Finally, mobilizing private capital is crucial. The Bank urges Ghana to attract investment into industries with strong job-creation potential, from light manufacturing to agro-processing and textiles, while using public–private partnerships and risk-sharing instruments to unlock financing for entrepreneurs and small businesses.

Ghana’s economy is urbanizing and shifting away from agriculture, but the transition has not yielded the productivity gains seen elsewhere. Normally, when workers leave agriculture, they move into high-productivity manufacturing or modern services. In Ghana’s case, many instead find themselves in lower-productivity areas such as petty trade or low-level government services. The result is that most of Ghana’s productivity growth, about 87 percent, has come from improvements within sectors rather than the reallocation of workers across sectors. Globally, one-third of productivity gains are usually driven by such structural change, underscoring Ghana’s missed opportunity. More troubling still, over the past decade this structural change has actually turned negative: workers have been moving into less productive sectors, dragging down growth.

The World Bank’s Export Potential Index points to three sectors where Ghana could grow: textiles and garments, electronics, and chemicals (including pharmaceuticals). These sectors together could generate billions in new export revenues; textiles alone hold a potential 43-fold expansion, worth an additional US$1.5 billion. Electronics could add US$1.3 billion, and chemicals about US$644 million. If Ghana can unlock these opportunities, the private sector could become a real driver of growth and job creation.

The barriers, however, are formidable. Externally, Ghana suffers from macroeconomic instability, weak infrastructure, and low investment. Annual infrastructure needs are estimated at US$4 billion, yet investment lags badly, particularly in transport, which nearly 80 percent of firms cite as a constraint. Gross capital formation is just 11 percent of GDP, far below Côte d’Ivoire’s 25 percent and Senegal’s 38 percent, reflecting a lack of spending on machinery, buildings, and logistics. Foreign direct investment has fallen to less than 2 percent of GDP, down from 6 percent in 2019. Internally, firms struggle with high borrowing costs, scarce credit, and regulatory bottlenecks. Credit to the private sector is only 10 percent of GDP, compared to 23 percent in Côte d’Ivoire and 31 percent in Senegal.

The World Bank’s 2024 B-READY report shines a light on these bottlenecks. Ghana scores especially poorly on market competition (32/100), reflecting weak protections against monopolistic behavior, and on dispute resolution (55/100), where court cases can drag on for nearly 900 days. Business entry remains cumbersome: registering a company can take up to 67 days for foreign firms, while building permits average 253 days, twice as long as in Côte d’Ivoire or Vietnam. Financing is another choke point: only 14 percent of firms use bank loans for investment, and innovative tools like factoring remain rare. Infrastructure services are unreliable, three-quarters of firms report frequent power outages, and broadband penetration is among the lowest in the region.

Trade barriers add another layer of cost. Clearing imports takes an average of 14 days, versus five in Morocco, while the cost of complying with export requirements can eat up nearly a quarter of the value of the goods themselves. Poor risk management and weak inter-agency coordination prevent Ghana from fully benefiting from opportunities like the African Continental Free Trade Area.

Finally, the tax and labor systems are widely seen as unfriendly to business. Over 80 percent of firms avoid claiming VAT refunds because the process is so complex, and nearly 90 percent say labor regulations are misaligned with the realities of a low-productivity economy.

Domestically, inflationary pressures and exchange rate volatility remain live threats, while weak state-owned enterprises, especially the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) and COCOBOD, could generate fresh losses that undermine the fiscal balance. Agriculture is vulnerable to climate shocks, and the perennial specter of election-related overspending could easily unravel recent gains.

To secure this path, the Bank lays out a series of recommendations spanning the short, medium, and long term. In the short run, Ghana must consolidate macro-financial stability by sticking strictly to the IMF Extended Credit Facility (ECF) program’s fiscal targets. The adoption of new fiscal rules should be backed by adequate resources for the Fiscal Council, enabling it to serve as an effective watchdog. Equally important is expenditure control, which the Bank notes can only be achieved by enforcing procurement reforms, preventing arrears accumulation, and ensuring all ministries, departments, and assemblies operate under unified financial management systems such as GIFMIS, GHANEPS, and the Treasury Single Account. On the revenue side, Ghana must fully implement the tax measures outlined in the 2025 budget, strictly apply the Tax Exemptions Law, and strengthen the Ghana Revenue Authority’s capacity to expand compliance through digital systems and risk-based audits.

Medium-term reforms, in the Bank’s view, must tackle the structural sources of fiscal imbalance. This requires overhauling ECG, potentially with private sector participation, to improve efficiency and reduce losses, while bringing the Energy Sector Recovery Program back on track. COCOBOD must also be comprehensively restructured to focus narrowly on its core mandate of cocoa production and marketing, rather than engaging in quasi-fiscal activities that weigh on the budget. Public-private partnerships should play a central role in bridging Ghana’s infrastructure gap, particularly in trade-related logistics and connectivity. At the same time, advancing digitalization and strengthening climate resilience will be critical for building a competitive and inclusive economy.

The 2026 Budget should be the instrument that cements the macro gains from the IMF engagement into durable, rule-based fiscal architecture. The economy is at an inflection point: policy stabilization under the IMF has restored some confidence, but the recovery will be fragile unless the 2026 fiscal plan locks short-term gains into permanent rules and institutions. The Budget must do more than hit a headline deficit target; it must change how revenue is raised and how public money is spent so that growth is not repeatedly eaten by energy losses, SOE drains and opaque quasi-fiscal operations. The World Bank’s country work underscores the same priorities: strengthen public finance systems, close fiscal leakages, and target financing toward growth-enhancing and climate-sensitive investments.

  • Revenue Mobilization Objective: Raise durable, low-distortion revenue while maintaining incentives for green investment and broadening the tax base.

  • VAT Reforms

VAT design and administration remain a core constraint on revenue performance. Ghana’s VAT system illustrates a striking paradox: despite one of the highest statutory VAT rates in the sub-region, actual revenue mobilization remains disappointingly low. Businesses face a cascading effect, multiple layers of tax imposed along the value chain, which raises costs, reduces competitiveness, and encourages evasion. This weakens the very base on which the VAT is supposed to rest. A review of the system is therefore urgent, both to reduce compliance costs for firms and to create a fairer, more efficient structure that encourages formalization and growth.

Also, VAT exemptions cost the economy approximately 4% of GDP annually. This is due to tax exemptions on VAT, Personal Income Tax (PIT), and import duties, resources that could otherwise fund health, education, and infrastructure. The World Bank and IMF have consistently flagged Ghana’s fragmented and overly generous exemption regime as one of the single largest sources of leakage in the tax system. Reforming these exemptions, while simultaneously modernizing refund processes and compliance systems, offers the highest immediate revenue gain with the least distortionary effect on investment decisions.

Exemptions must be rationalized: every exemption should be published in a comprehensive register, subjected to a fiscal cost analysis, and bound by sunset clauses so that unjustified provisions automatically expire. Compliance and administration must be modernized: rollout of e-invoicing, automated refund verification, and stronger Large Taxpayer Unit enforcement should reduce fraud and improve predictability for legitimate businesses. Together, these reforms would unlock additional revenue, while lowering costs for compliant firms and building confidence in the tax system.

Recommendations (VAT reforms):

  1. Publish a comprehensive exemption register and legislate automatic sunset clauses for all non-essential VAT exemptions.
  2. Undertake a full review of cascading effects in the VAT chain, with options for crediting or simplification to reduce compliance costs for businesses.
  3. Roll out mandatory e-invoicing for large taxpayers, coupled with risk-based refund audits, to curb abuse while speeding refunds for compliant firms.
  4. Set a measurable target to reduce VAT exemption costs from 4 %of GDP.

  • Unified Petroleum Pricing Fund (UPPF), reframe an opaque petroleum pricing system into a climate-compatible instrument

The Unified Petroleum Pricing Fund (UPPF) was created to equalize the cost of transporting petroleum products across the country, ensuring that consumers in remote districts pay the same ex-pump price as those in major cities. In principle, the fund plays an important role in promoting equity of access. In practice, however, its administration has been opaque, with limited public disclosure of inflows, outflows, and arrears. Audit reports and civil society reviews repeatedly flag governance concerns, raising questions about efficiency and accountability in its operations.

At the same time, Ghana’s fiscal and energy priorities are shifting. The government has committed to a clean energy transition, supported by development partners, and the World Bank has emphasized the need to reduce quasi-fiscal leakages in energy while creating credible, transparent financing channels for green investment. The UPPF sits uncomfortably at this intersection: it commands significant annual resources, but its opacity prevents it from being leveraged as part of the broader climate financing framework.

A review of the fund is therefore overdue. The first step must be radical transparency. A full public statement of UPPF accounts, inflows from levies, transfers to transporters, arrears owed, and any balances, should be published annually, audited externally, and presented to Parliament. Only after such transparency is established can the question of repurposing be credibly addressed.

One pragmatic option would be to create a “Green Window” within the UPPF framework, a time-bound, ring-fenced allocation of a percentage of inflows that could co-finance clean energy initiatives such as off-grid solar systems, rural electrification, or transport electrification pilots. This would link petroleum consumption to investment in the energy transition. Such a mechanism would also align with the World Bank’s recommendations that fiscal instruments be progressively climate-sensitive while ensuring core mandates are not compromised. However, any such reallocation must be carefully designed. Safeguards are needed to ensure that the Green Window does not undermine the Fund’s central purpose of petroleum distribution equalization, and that no diversion occurs without parliamentary approval.

Recommendations for UPPF:

  1. Publish an annual UPPF report detailing inflows, outflows, arrears, and balances, audited and presented to Parliament.
  2. Introduce governance reforms: independent oversight board with representation from MoF, NPA, civil society, and Parliament’s Finance Committee.
  3. Establish a Green Window, ring-fenced and time-bound, to channel a modest share of petroleum-related revenues into clean energy investments.

  1. A better revenue mobilization framework.

Beyond VAT and petroleum levies, Ghana’s revenue mobilization challenge is broader and structural. This not only constrains investment in social services and infrastructure but also keeps Ghana vulnerable to debt distress, as expenditure demands outpace domestic resource mobilization.

Property taxation remains the most underutilized instrument. Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) have a statutory mandate to collect property rates, yet collections have been negligible due to outdated valuation rolls, political resistance, and administrative weakness. The government’s recent efforts to digitize and centralize property rate administration through the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) offer a potential breakthrough, but they must be followed through with proper valuation, transparent rate-setting, and clear sharing formulas with local governments to sustain political buy-in.

Excise and environmental levies represent another underexploited avenue. Ghana’s growing environmental and health burdens, plastic waste, sugar-related health issues, and carbon emissions, provide both a rationale and an opportunity for targeted excises. The World Bank has encouraged the design of excise regimes that are not only revenue-generating but also corrective in nature, nudging behaviour towards healthier and more sustainable consumption patterns.

Finally, compliance and enforcement remain at the heart of Ghana’s revenue problem. Despite the rollout of e-VAT and electronic invoicing, tax evasion and underreporting remain high, particularly among medium-sized enterprises and the informal sector. Revenue mobilization will not improve unless enforcement is more predictable, penalties for evasion are credible, and the GRA is adequately resourced with technology and human capital.

A better framework for revenue mobilization should therefore combine four elements:

  • Broadening the base by rationalizing exemptions and bringing the informal sector progressively into the tax net through simplified presumptive schemes.
  • Deepening underutilized instruments such as property rates and environmental excises.
  • Enhancing compliance through technology-driven monitoring and risk-based audits.
  • Building trust by linking revenues to visible service delivery and fiscal transparency, thereby improving voluntary compliance.

Recommendations (Revenue framework):

  1. Complete the digitization and revaluation of property rates, ensuring equitable sharing between GRA and MMDAs.
  2. Expand environmental excise levies (e.g., plastics, sugary drinks, carbon-linked charges) with dual revenue and corrective objectives.
  3. Invest in compliance enforcement capacity, risk-based audits, data analytics, and taxpayer education, to build both deterrence and trust.

  1. Expenditure Management, plugging leakages and aligning spending with development priorities

If revenue reforms provide the inflows, prudent expenditure management determines whether those resources translate into sustainable development. For Ghana, the expenditure side of the budget remains riddled with inefficiencies: persistent losses from state-owned enterprises (SOEs), weak control over tax expenditures, and hidden quasi-fiscal activities that drain the treasury. These weaknesses not only crowd out priority spending but also undermine the credibility of fiscal consolidation efforts.

2.1 Addressing revenue leakages and losses from SOEs

Ghana’s SOE sector continues to impose a heavy fiscal burden. The 2022 State Ownership Report indicated that nearly two-thirds of commercial SOEs were loss-making, with cumulative net losses exceeding GH¢5 billion in recent years. Many operate with soft budget constraints, expecting eventual bailouts from the government. Such recurrent transfers and guarantees amount to disguised subsidies that erode fiscal space and weaken incentives for reform.

The World Bank has repeatedly urged Ghana to strengthen SOE governance, moving towards performance contracts, transparent reporting, and independent boards. For the 2026 budget cycle, this should mean more than reporting losses; it should involve binding fiscal rules: SOEs that fail to meet operational efficiency benchmarks should not qualify for government guarantees or transfers. Over the medium term, partial divestiture or strategic partnerships in non-strategic sectors could also reduce the fiscal risks.

Recommendations (SOEs):

  1. Enforce SOE performance contracts with measurable fiscal targets.
  2. Prohibit new government guarantees to loss-making SOEs unless part of a restructuring plan approved by Parliament.
  3. Publish a Fiscal Risk Statement annually, quantifying contingent liabilities from SOEs.

2.2 Rationalizing exemptions to support climate and energy transition

Ghana has taken initial steps to use tax policy as a lever for renewable energy adoption. Under the Renewable Energy Act and programs such as the Scaling-up Renewable Energy Program (SREP), imported solar panels are currently exempt from VAT and other levies. This reflects the government’s intention to promote clean energy and diversify Ghana’s power mix.

However, the current exemption regime is partial and conditional, limiting its effectiveness. While panels benefit from tax relief, key complementary components, including batteries, inverters, mounting systems, and installation services, remain subject to statutory taxes and levies. In addition, completed solar projects often face fiscal charges at the project level, reducing the net benefit of exemptions. The absence of a net metering framework further discourages large-scale adoption, since households and businesses cannot earn credits for excess power fed into the grid.

The result is that the cost of solar installations remains prohibitively high, especially for households and small businesses. This has slowed uptake, despite Ghana’s vast solar potential. Industry stakeholders such as the Ghana Chamber of Mines have consistently called for full-spectrum tax relief on solar-related equipment and services, as well as complementary regulatory reforms to unlock investment.

For the 2026 budget, therefore, the government has an opportunity to design a more coherent, climate-aligned exemption regime. Extending tax exemptions to all critical components of solar systems, accompanied by the introduction of a net metering framework, would significantly reduce installation costs, lower energy bills for households and businesses, and ease pressure on the national grid. These reforms would also dovetail with Ghana’s broader energy transition agenda and the World Bank’s emphasis on aligning fiscal measures with green growth.

Recommendations (Exemptions for solar):

  1. Expand tax exemptions beyond panels to include batteries, inverters, mounting systems, and installation services.
  2. Introduce a net metering framework in 2026 to encourage larger installations and improve investor confidence.
  3. Make exemptions time-bound and transparent, with annual reporting of foregone revenue and uptake levels.
  4. Align reforms with the National Energy Transition Plan, ensuring fiscal support accelerates climate objectives.

2.3 Eliminating quasi-fiscal expenditures

Perhaps the most corrosive element of Ghana’s expenditure framework is the persistence of quasi-fiscal activities, expenditures or subsidies carried out by public entities outside the budget process. Examples include below-cost power tariffs to industries, petroleum price smoothing, or directed lending through state banks without parliamentary appropriation. These activities obscure the true fiscal position, accumulate arrears, and weaken accountability.

Both the IMF and World Bank have emphasized the need to bring all such activities on-budget, subjecting them to fiscal ceilings and parliamentary scrutiny. For 2026, the government should commit to a quasi-fiscal expenditure elimination strategy, beginning with a full inventory of such practices, disclosure of their costs, and a clear timeline for phasing them out. Where social objectives are valid (e.g., electricity subsidies for lifeline consumers), these should be reclassified as explicit, budgeted subsidies rather than hidden transfers.

Recommendations (Quasi-fiscal):

  1. Conduct and publish a comprehensive inventory of quasi-fiscal activities across the energy, financial, and transport sectors.
  2. Reclassify valid social subsidies as on-budget transfers, subject to parliamentary appropriation.
  3. Eliminate all non-essential quasi-fiscal operations consistent with IMF program benchmarks.

The 2026 Budget is the government’s chance to convert the IMF-World Bank stabilization window into institutional reform. That requires a revenue package focused on VAT integrity and pragmatic instruments (property tax, excise rationalization), a hard-nosed approach to SOE and quasi-fiscal drains (full disclosure, conditional support), and carefully targeted, time-bound incentives that respond to the B-READY diagnosis of constraints on private investment. Where possible, channel petroleum-related funds to climate investment only after governance and legal safeguards are in place, and always prioritise concessional financing for big-ticket projects to protect debt sustainability. These steps are exactly the direction advised in recent World Bank and IMF work and should form the backbone of the Budget’s medium-term narrative.

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
WhatsApp
WhatsApp

More News/Articles

Subscribe to our newsletter

Get the latest News/Updates in your inbox!