It looks like we got it right with our election of the President of the Republic of Ghana—absolute majority, clear succession plan, a definitive term limit, and a clear procedure for challenging the election of President. However, there is an owing onerous work to make parliamentary representation of the people absolute and inclusive.
The recent discourse around parliamentary vacancies in Ghana—led by constitutional scholars Prof. H. Kwasi Prempeh and Prof. Stephen Kwaku Asare—has reignited public interest in a broader question that lies beneath the surface: What democratic compromises are acceptable when electoral design collides with fiscal reality? While their proposals address the efficiency of vacancy management, the deeper structural defect—the very method of electing MPs—remains largely unchallenged. If Ghana is to resolve the recurring dilemma of underrepresentation, cost-intensive by-elections, and exclusion of minority voices, the Constitutional Review Committee must confront the limitations of the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system that has governed parliamentary elections since 1992.
Both Professor Prempeh and Asare argue persuasively for reforming Article 112(6) of the 1992 Constitution, which currently bars by-elections within the final three months of a parliamentary term. They propose extending this “blackout period” to one year and substituting full-scale by-elections with either party-nominated replacements or legislative caucus surrogacy. Their goal is to eliminate the anomaly of electing MPs for mere months—often spent campaigning or in recess—while drawing full salaries and ex gratia. The comparative analogies, from vice-presidential succession to party list replacements in other democracies, add texture to their argument. However, the current constitutional framework anchors Parliament in the principle of direct constituency representation. MPs are elected individually by constituents, not installed by party executives or nominated lists. Any deviation from that model—such as allowing parties to fill vacancies—risks breaching democratic legitimacy and contravening the guarantee of universal adult suffrage in Article 42.
The by-election dilemma is symptomatic of a larger design failure. Ghana’s FPTP system rewards plurality winners—in cases where they capture below 50% of the total votes. This winner-takes-all logic disenfranchises voters whose preferred candidates lost narrowly, entrenches duopoly politics between NPP and NDC, discourages coalition-building and policy-centred campaigning, and makes sudden vacancies more destabilizing because there are no alternates or proportional mechanisms to cushion the effect. Moreover, FPTP inflates the political cost of elections for smaller parties, effectively locking them out of Parliament unless they can concentrate support geographically. As a result, women-led parties, youth movements, and ideological outliers are systematically excluded—undermining Ghana’s commitments to diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) in governance.
The Constitutional Review Committee, chaired by Prof. Prempeh, has a unique opportunity to examine alternatives that protect representation while promoting inclusion and resilience.
- Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) System: This method combines direct constituency elections with proportional party list representation. Voters cast two ballots—one for an MP and one for a party. This ensures every vote counts and allows parties to fill seats based on overall national support.
- Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV): In this method, voters rank candidates by preference. If no candidate wins a majority, the lowest-ranking is eliminated and votes redistributed until one emerges with majority backing. This boosts consensus candidates and discourages tactical voting. It also assures the second most preferred candidate who can take up the seat when it is vacant.
- Party List with Local Vetting: In a Party List Proportional Representation system, voters elect a group of MPs from larger constituencies based on party lists, ensuring that seats in parliament closely reflect the proportion of votes each party receives. Even if parties nominate replacements during vacancy grace periods, candidates must be vetted or endorsed by local constituency councils. This could balance efficiency with democratic legitimacy and prevent elite imposition.
These models are not alien to African democracies. South Africa uses proportional representation to fill its National Assembly. Mauritius blends FPTP with best loser seats to ensure community balance. Rwanda reserves seats for women and marginalized groups through electoral colleges. Ghana can draw from these models without sacrificing local sovereignty.
Ultimately, reforming vacancy management and voting systems should not be viewed as technocratic adjustments. They go to the heart of Ghana’s democratic architecture—how power is distributed, who gets heard, and whose votes count. The proposals by Professors H. Kwasi Prempeh and Kwaku Asare, while smart and timely, risk retrofitting a broken electoral chassis unless paired with voting reform. The FPTP no longer meets Ghana’s aspirations for inclusive, efficient, and accountable governance.
The Constitutional Review Committee should widen its aperture: not just how to fill empty seats, but how to design a legislature that reflects the country’s political diversity, shields it from unnecessary electoral volatility, and builds systemic equity for marginalized voices. The constitutional reform is a generational opportunity—let it be bold, inclusive, and forward-looking.
Recommendation
The Constitutional Review Committee should initiate a structured national dialogue on reforming Ghana’s parliamentary electoral system, with a focus on transitioning from the first-past-the-post model to a more inclusive framework such as mixed-member proportional representation. This reform would reduce vote wastage, empower smaller parties, and enable smoother management of mid-term parliamentary vacancies. As part of this overhaul, Article 112(6) should be amended to extend the by-election blackout window to 12 months post-election, allowing parties or caucuses—under strict legal safeguards and local vetting—to temporarily fill seats. These actions would not only increase legislative diversity but also align Ghana’s democratic architecture with its evolving civic aspirations.
Further Reading
- CRC chair proposes political party replacements for MPs who die within 12 months of election | Politics
- Proposal for No-by-Election Blackout Extension Debate Recommended
- Party List Proportional Representation – Electoral Reform Society – ERS
Credit- IMANI’s Criticality Analysis of Governance and Economic Issues July 6-12.


