GARID: The Bigger Question Is Not the Delay. It Is Whether the Spending Reduced Flooding

By: Kay Codjoe, IMANI Associate

The debate about the Greater Accra Resilient and Integrated Development (GARID) Project has gone in the wrong direction. People keep asking whether the project was delayed. That is not the first question we should be asking. The first question is much simpler.
Did the money achieve the purpose for which it was borrowed?

GARID was created after years of devastating floods in Accra. In 2019, Parliament approved a US$200 million World Bank loan to reduce flooding, improve drainage, strengthen waste management and protect communities living in flood-prone areas. In 2023, another US$150 million was added, bringing the total project to US$350 million. The purpose never changed. The money was borrowed to reduce flooding.

I examined Parliament’s approval documents, the World Bank’s flood strategy, project reports and the GARID transaction ledger. The findings raise important questions. The transaction ledger contains about 2,688 payments. Altogether, the project committed GH¢592.34 million, paid out GH¢551.57 million, and still has about GH¢40.78 million outstanding. Those are big numbers. But spending money is not the same as solving a problem.

The first six years of the project reveal a striking spending pattern. Between 2019 and 2024, GARID spent about GH¢277.46 million. Yet only about GH¢65.07 million, roughly 23 percent, can be clearly linked to actual flood-control works such as drains and engineering projects. The rest went into consultancy services, engineering designs, feasibility studies, training, workshops, project management, ICT equipment, weather monitoring systems, vehicles, sanitation programmes and community activities.

The expenditure profile changes dramatically after 2025. Between 2025 and 2026, GARID spent another GH¢274.11 million. This time, about GH¢208.95 million, or 76 percent, went into actual drainage and flood-control works. The payments increasingly relate to Odaw dredging, Kaneshie drainage, Nima drainage, Achimota drainage, Akweteyman drainage, culverts, concrete drains and engineering construction.

That raises an obvious question. Why did a project created to reduce flooding spend its early years looking more like a planning project before shifting heavily towards construction? Only the government can answer that.

The World Bank’s own implementation report raises even more questions. By June 2025, about US$127.1 million had already been disbursed. Yet many of the project’s principal flood performance indicators remained largely unmet. The carrying capacity of the Odaw Channel had not increased. No flood detention ponds had been completed. The Flood Early Warning System was still not fully operational. None of the three planned bridge reconstructions had been completed. Only 0.10 kilometres of the planned six kilometres of drainage rehabilitation had been completed.

These were the project’s own reported performance indicators. They do not necessarily mean the project failed, but they do show that money spent is not, by itself, proof that flood risk has been reduced.

The transaction ledger also raises several issues that deserve explanation. About 83 transactions, worth roughly GH¢38.66 million, appear similar enough to require reconciliation. Repeated descriptions, invoice references and payment values should be matched against contracts, engineers’ certificates, interim payment certificates and payment records.

Another GH¢117.76 million cannot be conclusively classified from the transaction descriptions alone. The expenditure includes servers, drones, weather stations, radar systems and monitoring equipment. Without procurement records, delivery certificates, commissioning reports and engineer verification, it is impossible to determine whether these purchases strengthened flood resilience or primarily supported project administration.

There is another important point. About GH¢362.34 million, almost 66 percent of all payments, is recorded as Assets. That sounds reassuring until one remembers that a vehicle is an asset. A laptop is an asset. A server is an asset. A storm drain is also an asset. They do not all reduce flooding. Until the Government publishes a complete asset register, Parliament and the public cannot determine how much of that GH¢362.34 million became permanent flood-protection infrastructure.

Government should explain the status of the GH¢40.78 million in outstanding commitments and publish, to the fullest extent permitted by law, the GARID contract register, project completion register, engineer certifications, and maps of completed flood-control infrastructure.

Citizens measure GARID not by payments processed but by floods prevented. These are constitutional questions. Every taxpayer has the right to know whether public funds approved by Parliament achieved their intended purpose. GARID was created to reduce flooding. The money has been spent. The State now owes the public measurable evidence that flood risk has been reduced.

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