In Part I, we established that something is shifting. Now we examine how. Because in any functioning system, decisions follow process. Procurement precedes award. Evaluation precedes selection. Contracts precede execution. But when outcomes begin to appear before processes are completed, the system has already changed. That is the point Ghana’s insurance market is approaching.
Let us start with the law. Insurance placement for State-Owned Enterprises and specified entities is not discretionary. It falls squarely within Ghana’s public procurement framework, governed by the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663), as amended by Act 914. That law is clear in principle. Public entities must ensure competitive tendering, transparency in evaluation, value for money, and non-discrimination among qualified providers. There are exceptions, but they are narrow. Sole sourcing, for instance, must be justified under strict conditions such as exclusive capability, urgency, or standardisation. It is not a default option.
Now, place that legal framework next to what is happening. A policy signal is issued. State entities begin to prioritise a specific insurer. Renewals shift. Participation narrows. And in some cases, existing placements are disrupted before their natural contractual cycle. At that point, the legal question becomes unavoidable. Where is the tender? Where is the evaluation? Where is the documented justification? Because without those, the process is no longer procurement. It is an allocation. And allocation without process is precisely what Act 663 was designed to prevent.
Now consider the structure of the beneficiary. SIC Insurance PLC is not a statutory monopoly. It is a commercial, publicly listed company. Government holds a minority stake, while private investors hold the majority. It competes in the same market as Enterprise, GLICO, Hollard, Star Assurance, and others. That means any preferential placement of state insurance business with SIC cannot be justified as an internal government allocation. It must meet the same competitive and legal standards as any other insurer. Anything short of that introduces distortion.
Now move to the Ghana Gas case, which sits at the centre of this dispute. Ghana National Gas Company is not just another account. It is a strategic energy asset with complex operational risks involving gas processing infrastructure, pipeline networks, industrial facilities, and third-party liabilities. Insurance for such an asset is not decided casually. It requires risk engineering, structured underwriting, international reinsurance participation, and multi-year placement commitments.
According to submissions made by GLICO General Insurance Ltd, the company had secured a structured insurance programme for Ghana Gas, with participation from A-rated international reinsurers, including the London market. It had arranged a two-year locked-in reinsurance structure and negotiated pricing advantages at the international level. If those claims are accurate, then the insurance programme was not merely local. It was integrated into the global reinsurance system.
Now introduce the disruption. GLICO indicates that its role as lead insurer was terminated effective 31st December 2025, with a different insurer stepping in from 1st January 2026. That raises three critical questions. Was the transition subjected to a competitive procurement process? Were the existing contractual obligations reviewed and lawfully terminated? Were the implications for international reinsurance commitments assessed?
Because once reinsurance capacity is allocated, it is not easily reversed. It is priced, committed, and supported by balance sheets outside Ghana. If that structure is disrupted unilaterally, the consequences do not remain local. They affect Ghana’s credibility in international insurance markets, future pricing of risk, availability of reinsurance capacity, and the long-term cost of insuring strategic assets. This is not a theoretical risk. It is how global insurance systems operate.
Now layer in another dimension. GLICO’s petition raises concerns about third-party engagements in reinsurance negotiations involving entities that exercise regulatory or quasi-regulatory influence while maintaining competing commercial interests in the same market. If such engagements occurred without the authority of the insurer of record, they may conflict with provisions under the Insurance Act, 2021 (Act 1061), particularly around authorised placement structures, regulatory oversight, and market conduct standards. At that point, the issue is no longer commercial. It becomes regulatory. And when regulatory boundaries begin to blur, confidence begins to weaken.
Now step back and observe the pattern. A policy signal is issued. A preferred direction emerges. Market behaviour adjusts. Contracts shift. Legal questions follow. This is how systems change. Not through one decision, but through a sequence of aligned actions. And when those actions begin to bypass established processes, the risk is not just inefficiency. It is precedent. Because once a system demonstrates that outcomes can be influenced without strict adherence to procurement and regulatory frameworks, that approach does not remain isolated. It spreads. Today, it is insurance.
Tomorrow, it could be energy procurement, infrastructure contracts, or financial service mandates. That is why this moment matters. Not because one insurer gains or another loses, but because the integrity of the process itself is being tested. If state institutions can be guided, directly or indirectly, toward predetermined outcomes without transparent competition, then the foundation of public procurement begins to weaken. And once that foundation weakens, the consequences are not immediate. They accumulate. Pricing becomes less efficient. Innovation slows. Private investment hesitates. Regulatory confidence declines. And over time, the cost returns to the same place it always does. The citizen. So this is where we must be precise.
The question is not whether state insurers should participate in public sector business. They should. The question is whether they should win that business through competition or receive it through direction. Because the difference between those two paths is the difference between a functioning market and a managed one. And Ghana must decide, clearly and deliberately, which system it is building. In the final part, we move from diagnosis to direction on what must be done, what must be clarified, and what must be protected before this shift becomes permanent.
For feedback, comments and questions about this article, please reach out to Kay Codjoe, an Associate of IMANI at contact@kaycodjoe.com


