When the leadership of MTN Ghana, the nation’s largest telecom operator, states that fibre cuts remain their “major challenge,” it should be treated as a national economic and security alert. This is not a mere inconvenience; it is a persistent, systemic failure to protect the most foundational layer of our digital society.
Ghana has correctly identified its digital infrastructure as critical. The Cybersecurity Act, 2020 (Act 1038) empowers the state to designate “Critical Information Infrastructure” (CII), and fibre optic networks are rightfully on that list. However, a dangerous gap exists between this classification and our on-the-ground reality.
We are failing to protect this CII because we are stuck in a siloed mindset. We treat “cybersecurity” as a high-level software and data problem, while the most effective and common attack on our network is a low-level, physical one: the blade of a bulldozer.
The Physical Attack is a Cyber Attack
A cyber-attack is any action that compromises the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of digital systems. A fibre cut is the most brutal and effective form of an “availability” attack—a physical-layer Denial of Service (DoS) that can take banks, hospitals, schools, and government services offline instantly.
Our current policy framework, including the Cybersecurity Act, is primarily geared towards protecting “up the stack”—guarding against hacking, data breaches, and malware. This is essential, but it ignores the fundamental truth: a severed cable can achieve what a thousand hackers cannot.
If our entire strategy for protecting our CII doesn’t include the physical ground it sits in, our digital ambitions are built on sand.
Why Reactionary Punishments Will Fail
The current national conversation, including proposals by the National Communications Authority (NCA) to amend the Electronic Communications Act, is dangerously fixated on reactionary measures. These proposals—steep fines, “three times the cost of repair,” and potential prison terms for offenders—are entirely predictable. And they will not work.
This approach is flawed for two key reasons:
- It’s Punishment, Not Prevention: By the time a contractor is fined, the damage is done. The bank has lost millions in transactions, the patient’s digital record was inaccessible, and national productivity has taken a hit. A fine does not retroactively prevent the disruption.
- It Misdiagnoses the Root Cause: The problem is not simply a few rogue actors. The problem is a systemic, nationwide failure of coordination.
The Real Root Cause: A Failure of Coordination
As experts in this space, we have consistently pointed out that the vast majority of fibre cuts are not malicious. They are the inevitable result of uncoordinated construction and the chaotic, non-existent management of our “road reservations” or utility corridors.
We have a situation where:
- Road contractors begin work without accurate, consolidated maps of subterranean utilities.
- Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Assemblies (MMDAs) issue construction and excavation permits in a vacuum, without a mandatory check against a central infrastructure database.
- Different utility providers (water, power, fibre) dig up the same corridors at different times, multiplying the risk of damage with each excavation.
Fining a construction company for cutting a cable it was never informed about is not justice; it’s a tax on chaos.
A Proactive Policy for a Resilient Future
Instead of focusing all our energy on building a better ambulance at the bottom of the cliff, we must focus on building a fence at the top. The solution is not primarily punitive; it is structural and collaborative.
We must move from a policy of punishment to a policy of coordination.
- Mandate a National “Dig Once” Policy: This must be the cornerstone of our infrastructure strategy. Any time a road is being built or significantly repaired, a common, shared ducting system for all utilities (fibre, power, water) must be installed. This dramatically reduces future cuts, lowers deployment costs for telcos, and minimizes public disruption.
- Create a Centralized National Utility Map: The NCA, in collaboration with the Ministry of Roads and Highways, the Lands Commission, and MMDAs, must be empowered to create and manage a single, authoritative digital map of all subterranean utility infrastructure.
- Tie Permits to the Map: No MMDA should be permitted to issue an excavation or building permit without first cross-referencing the site with this national map and ensuring all affected utility owners (like MTN) have been notified and are present to supervise.
Protecting our digital lifeline is not the sole responsibility of the Cyber Security Authority (CSA) or the NCA. It requires a whole-of-government approach that ropes in the Ministry of Roads, local government, and private contractors.
Until we fix the systemic chaos in our utility corridors, fibre cuts will remain our “major challenge,” and our digital future will remain fragile, vulnerable to the next swing of an excavator, backhoe, or pickaxe.


