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Criticality Analysis of Governance & Economic Issues

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Criticality Analysis of Governance Issues

August 4-August 8, 2025





What is the Criticality Analysis of Governance Issues?

The output of good governance is socioeconomic development that has greater impact on the citizens. Government takes the wheels of affairs of the state on the back of the many promises made to the electorates. Yet, it is no easy task when it comes to the processes and mechanisms required for true public services delivery. It must follow policy guidelines religiously, maintain the social contract, avoid excesses and wastages, and be an accountable steward of that which it has been entrusted.

IMANI Centre for Policy and Education in a bid to monitor the processes and mechanisms for public services delivery has devised the Criticality Analysis to evaluate the key actions of the government in this pursuit. The Criticality Analysis follows the major news reports on the key governance issues categorised under the following six (6) themes:

1. Policy and administration.
2. Transparency and accountability.
3. Anti-corruption.
4. Peace, security and stability.
5. Human rights and justice.
6. International relations and development

The Criticality Analysis assesses the key governance issues by employing rigorous narrative analysis. First, we collect the key governance issues from reliable and credible news sources. A preliminary screening is conducted to filter out low-impact and non-governance related issues. The issues are then categorised under the 6 main themes. The criticality analysis is not a performance assessment of government actions.

During the assessment, critical attention is paid to the factual accuracy of the reports, relevance and timeliness, and impact and significance. In view of this, the reports are corroborated by analysing same from multiple sources and monitoring the trends and development. In addition, expert opinions on the key issues are analysed to inform the final output of the Criticality Analysis which includes our recommendations for policy and practice to enhance public service delivery and accountable stewardship



When Disaster Strikes: Ghana's Ignored Crisis On the Road

Ghana's sense of security was shattered by the horror of a military helicopter crash on the mist-shrouded forest mountains of Adansi Akrofuom that claimed the lives of our Defence and Environment Ministers, Hon. Omane Boamah and Hon. Murtala Mohammed respectively, and 6 others. As investigators parse through weather data, maintenance logs and flight recordings to determine the cause of the crash, the tragedy has laid bare fault lines in our national crisis response that no inquiry can paper over.

From the corridors of power to the dusty streets of our towns, the aftermath of these events has exposed a sobering truth: Ghana's relative immunity from large-scale disasters has bred complacency. When crises are few and far between, planning for the worst becomes optional, and procurement processes become ripe for corruption. In a landscape where "emergencies" translate to opportunities for padding contract lines and inflating budgets, leaders expend more energy lining their pockets than safeguarding the public.

This lull in calamities must end. We need to institutionalise risk aversion through regular simulation exercises, tabletop drills and scenario games that force every ministry, every agency and every district assembly to confront the chaos of a worst-case scenario —before it happens. These rehearsals should not be perfunctory annual rituals but rigorous, multidisciplinary engagements involving meteorologists, engineers, first responders, community leaders and civil society actors. Only by embedding preparedness in our professional DNA can we dismantle the mindsets that treat safety as an afterthought.

Yet while we debate military protocol and ministerial accountability, there is a silent epidemic unfolding on our highways and byways. Road transport in Ghana is a death trap. A week before the helicopter crash, the Savior Church, Ghana, had been grief-stricken when 16 of their children perished in a grisly road accident, and just a day after the crash, multiple people were feared dead in an accident involving a 2M Express Bus.

Pothole-littered pavement, decrepit vehicles rolling off the assembly line of improvisation, and "trotro" operators whose only oversight comes when a body is pulled from the wreckage—each element conspires to turn daily commutes into a lottery of survival.

According to Mercedes-Benz Sprinter Van dimensions, the vans are only configurable for passenger seating of 12 up to 15 passengers, that is, 1 driver, 1 passenger at the front, 3 passengers on three or two rows of seats at the rear, and 4 passengers on the back seat at the rear. But ask any urban commuter about trotro safety, and you'll hear the same litany: vans once used as ambulances or cargo carriers, cut down the middle and refitted with five to four rows of bench seats, packed to four across in the rear and three upfront. That is 19 to 23 passengers, without a single seat belt for the back-row passengers. The Toyota Hiace "fish" and Hyundai 100 minibus fleets follow similar blueprints, each rigged to carry far beyond manufacturer limits. At highway checkpoints, rather than enforcing weight limits or inspecting brake systems, some officers have turned rubber-stamping into a side hustle—extorting bribes and waving rickety vehicles through with a crooked nod.

The human cost of this neglect is staggering. According to the National Road Safety Authority, Ghana recorded 13,489 road traffic crashes in 2024, resulting in 2,494 fatalities and 15,607 injuries across 22,975 vehicles; in the first quarter of 2025 alone, 3,674 reported crashes claimed 752 lives and left 4,287 people injured across 6,143 vehicles.

Behind each number lies a family devastated, an income lost, and a community forever scarred.

Confronting this scourge demands a two-pronged approach. First, tighten regulations on vehicle conversions: establish national safety standards for seat belts, structural modifications and maintenance schedules, enforced by unannounced inspections and backed by real penalties for non-compliance. Second, overhaul checkpoint operations through body-worn cameras, a digital registry of offenders and community watchdog committees that can report extortion without fear of reprisal.

Ultimately, dismantling Ghana's road-safety crisis means changing deeply ingrained behaviours. Drivers must embrace seatbelt use and speed limits as non-negotiable. Passengers must learn to refuse overloading and demand safe vehicles. Civil society organisations can amplify survivors' stories and lobby for transparent accident investigations. When citizens wield collective pressure, even the most sluggish authorities are forced to act.

Our recent tragedies—both in the air and on the ground—are not isolated calamities but warning sirens. They remind us that every life lost to avoidable causes is an indictment of systems that put profit and expedience above protection and prevention. If Ghana is to honour the memories of those young churchgoers and our fallen ministers, we must channel our grief into action, forging a culture of preparedness that safeguards not only against headline-making crises but also the everyday perils on our roads.

Recommendation

Ghana's National Road Safety Authority should strengthen its regulatory framework by mandating that all commercial passenger vans conform strictly to the manufacturer's original seating capacity of 12 to 15 passengers, with every seat crash-tested and fitted with a functional seatbelt. To enforce this, the NSRA must expand its pre-registration checklist to require a digital inspection that verifies seat dimensions, belt integrity, and chassis compliance before any commercial registration is granted. Non-compliant vehicles would be denied registration, and operators found to be operating overloaded or belt-deficient vans would incur escalating sanctions, ranging from substantial fines to suspension of commercial licenses. Vehicles on the road that cannot be upgraded to the new safety standards must be phased out, with drivers supported by robust finance schemes to purchase newer and safer vehicles. Regular, unannounced roadside audits and publicly accessible compliance scores will further incentivise adherence, embed a culture of responsibility and proactively safeguard all road users.

Further readings

- Helicopter Crash Ghana: Ghana Air Force helicopter crashes near Obuasi; 8 confirmed dead – Graphic Online
- Ghana government ministers among 8 killed in helicopter crash | CNN
- 16 members of Saviour Church perish in road crash – Ghanaian Times
- Multiple killed in horrific 2M Express bus crash on Ejisu-Konongo Road
- Mercedes-Benz Sprinter Van Dimensions | Mercedes-Benz of Hoffman Estates
- How Many Passengers Can Fit In A Sprinter Van? – Road Trucks





A Strategic Turn in Ghana's Monetary Policy and Its Ripple Effects

Last week, the Bank of Ghana slashed its Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) by 300 basis points to 25.0 percent, marking its most aggressive single reduction since July 2024 and March 2018. The decision came at the conclusion of the 125th Monetary Policy Committee meeting and reflects growing confidence in the country's disinflation trajectory and macroeconomic stability. Governor Dr. Johnson Asiama noted that sustained disinflation, fiscal consolidation, and prior tightening measures have anchored inflation expectations, creating room to ease monetary conditions. This bold move aims to catalyse private sector credit expansion and support the ongoing recovery in business activity.

The MPR cut was propelled by a significant fall in headline inflation, which dipped to 13.7 percent in June 2025—the lowest since December 2021—down from a peak of 54 percent at the end of 2022. Tight monetary policy, improved food supply conditions, and a stronger cedi all contributed to the disinflation trend, reinforcing the Committee's view that conditions can safely accommodate lower borrowing costs. Meanwhile, short-term interest rates across the money market have declined sharply, reducing government borrowing costs and signalling broader easing.

Despite global headwinds—geopolitical tensions, tariff disputes, and pending utility tariff adjustments—domestic data painted a clear path for relief in lending rates.

A glance at historical policy rates underscores the dramatic shift. Since the inception of the rediscount rate in the early 2000s, through the bank rate and prime rate eras, the MPR has oscillated widely. It hit record highs of 29.50 percent in May 2023 before inching down in the months leading up to the current reduction. Conversely, the MPR bottomed at 12.50 percent in January 2012 amid protracted disinflation. The latest cut to 25 percent not only reverses much of the steep hiking cycle of 2022–23 but also aligns with the Bank's medium-term inflation target of 8 ± 2 percent by year's end.

Analysts have pointed out that lower benchmark rates should translate into reduced Average Lending Rates (ALR) and Ghana Reference Rates (GRR) at commercial banks. Indeed, the ALR declined from 30.75 percent in January to 27.0 percent in June, a cumulative drop of 375 basis points. However, the pass-through from policy to lending rates often faces lags driven by banks' funding costs, liquidity considerations, and risk buffers.

Even with a lower MPR, banks may hesitate to cut their lending spreads immediately if deposit rates, non-performing loan provisions, and operational costs remain elevated.

When setting lending rates, banks typically reference the policy rate as a cap while adding margins reflecting credit risk and funding costs. They incorporate the prevailing Treasury bill and interbank rates, their own cost of funds, overheads, and a risk premium determined by the "Five Cs": character (borrower credit history), capacity (ability to repay), capital (borrower's equity), collateral (assets pledged), and conditions (economic environment). This multi-factor approach means that while the MPR provides a lower bound, actual borrowing costs hinge on borrower profiles and market conditions.

In other developments, the Bank of Ghana has expanded its licensing regime to include three credit-reference bureaus—Dun & Bradstreet, MyCredit Score and XDS Data—marking the formal establishment of a unified credit-information framework in Ghana. By aggregating and standardising corporate and individual credit histories, these licensed bureaus enhance market transparency and respond to longstanding calls for reliable data in the debt markets. With independent, rigorously verified credit reports, financial institutions can more accurately assess default risk, issuers can benchmark borrowing terms with greater precision, and pricing efficiencies across both loan and bond markets should improve.

Over time, a robust credit-reference system is expected to deepen Ghana's corporate bond market, reduce information asymmetry, and lower financing costs for creditworthy borrowers.

July's headline inflation fell further to 12.1 percent, marking the seventh consecutive monthly decline and the lowest rate since October 2021. On a monthly basis, prices still rose by 0.7 percent, highlighting persistent short-term pressures. Simultaneously, the cedi has appreciated against the dollar—trading at around GHS 10.50 per USD at end-July, down from over GHS 15.50 in March 2025—prompting banks to consider hedging strategies in a bid to preserve margins as Treasury bill yields compress. The dual trends of lower domestic rates and a firmer currency complicate the pass-through dynamic, as banks weigh currency risk alongside credit pricing.

For businesses, the MPR reduction promises cheaper short-term funding, improved working capital financing, and enhanced cash flow management. Lower policy rates can reduce the cost of overdrafts, inventory loans, and project financing, thereby supporting expansion plans and easing liquidity constraints. However, the full benefit hinges on banks' willingness to adjust lending rates promptly and on firms' creditworthiness. In an environment still shaped by currency volatility, inflation risks, and evolving regulatory standards—including the new credit rating regime—businesses must navigate carefully to leverage these monetary tailwinds effectively.

Beyond headline rate adjustments, the interplay between inflation, exchange rates, credit infrastructure, and bank lending practices will define Ghana's growth trajectory in the latter half of 2025. As the central bank signals readiness for further easing, close monitoring of transmission channels, borrower risk profiles, and global headwinds remains crucial for policymakers, financial institutions, and businesses alike.

Recommendation

Businesses should proactively reassess their financing strategies in light of the recent MPR reduction by exploring opportunities for lower-cost credit, renegotiating existing loan terms, and prioritising investments that yield medium-term returns. Firms should also strengthen their credit profiles by improving financial disclosures and collateral quality to benefit from emerging credit rating systems. Given the volatility in exchange rates and declining T-bill yields, businesses must adopt prudent hedging strategies and diversify revenue streams to mitigate currency and interest rate risks while positioning themselves for growth in a gradually easing monetary environment.

Further Reading

- Editorial: Policy rate cut by 3%, much to the relief of businesses
- Inflation declines further to 12.1% in July 2025
- Exchange Rate – Bank of Ghana
- Ghana Interest Rate
- Monetary-Policy-Report-March-2025.pdf



Criticality Analysis of Key Economic Issues

August 4-August 8, 2025





Introduction

The objective of this report is to provide a clear and concise evaluation of the most important economic news stories in the preceding week, focusing on their factual accuracy, relevance and timeliness, and impact and significance.

Methodology

Selected publications are grouped under five central economic themes. These include:

- Economic Stability.
- Growth and Job Creation.
- Taxation and Revenue Mobilization.
- Trade and Investment.
- Infrastructure Digital Economy.

Evaluation

The analysis criteria are applied at this stage. News stories are evaluated based on the following:

Factual accuracy: can the facts in the news be verified; is the news published by other outlets; are there links and references to original sources.

Relevance and timeliness: is the news a developing story or does it provide updates on existing stories?

Impact and significance: does the news have a potential impact on society, policy and the economy; is it of high interest to the public?



Persistent Revenue Leakages in SOEs: Ghana Water Company (GWL) & Cocoa Processing Company (CPC)

The Ghana Water Company Limited has reported losing 73 million gallons of treated water every day in Greater Accra, which accounts for over half of its daily production[1]. The Managing Director reported that Greater Accra produces roughly 140 million gallons daily but can only account for about 67 million gallons, meaning about 73 million gallons are lost each day through theft, illegal connections, and faulty infrastructure. About 48% of the produced water is properly billed/collected, meaning more than half of the production generates zero revenue. Also, Cocoa Processing Company's unaudited financial statements show a US$10.23 million net loss in Q3 2025, up from US$9.57m last year, with revenues down 27%[2][3], with revenues down 27 per cent, operating losses rising to US$7.29 million, gross losses widening, short-term borrowings of roughly US$35 million within a total debt stock of US$38.72 million, trade payables surging and value-added confectionery output falling by 30 per cent.

This continues a pattern of periodic losses across public enterprises. In both cases, the companies are producing but not capturing value. When an SOE's revenue leak becomes structural and is built into operations over the years, it erodes its capital base. Reserves that should fund maintenance and upgrades are not available. CPC's per-share equity deterioration and GWL's unpaid supply mean that balance sheets and service capacity degrade. Additionally, this results in a service degradation loop, where falling cash flow leads to deferred maintenance, increased breakdowns, and ultimately, lower revenue.

This will eventually make SOEs' fiscal liabilities. Every bailout diverts funds from schools, health, and infrastructure. In the last decade, Ghana has spent hundreds of millions plugging SOE deficits without solving the leakages. Additionally, CPC's inability to profit from cocoa processing reinforces Ghana's dependence on raw exports, ceding value-added opportunities to competitors like Côte d'Ivoire. The losses stem largely from high operational costs, limited access to raw cocoa beans, debt servicing pressure, and dependence on imported inputs for value-added cocoa products. This situation signals systemic challenges in Ghana's agro-processing sector, where domestic raw material abundance does not always translate into competitive finished goods.

The economy also loses on the production side: failing to monetise water and failing to add value to cocoa both reduce the multiplier impacts of public assets. Jobs are lost, supply chains contract, and export potential is weakened when processors cannot sustain value-added production.

Fixing this must be practical, and it must be sequenced. First, stop the bleeding. Close the leak before funding growth. For GWL, that means an immediate, visible programme in high-loss districts: rapid metering and replacement of the worst burst mains, a focused enforcement drive to seal illegal connections. For CPC, the first act must be a cash-preservation plan that prioritises the production lines with the quickest margin recovery, negotiates short-term creditor forbearance and freezes non-essential spend while management lays out a verifiable turnaround plan.

Second, make any financial support conditional and measurable. If the state underwrites liquidity or guarantees new debt, such as the proposed Afreximbank facility[4], those concessions must be tied to public KPIs. Conditional support protects the fiscal anchor and forces managerial accountability.

Combine technical fixes with smart private engagement. Metering, digital billing and mobile payments remove easy leakages from the system. Piloted PPPs or management contracts for distribution zones can deliver operational discipline quickly.

Persistent revenue leakages make SOEs quietly insolvent long before the balance sheet shows collapse. If GWL keeps losing half its water, and CPC keeps losing a quarter of its revenue each year, the eventual failure moment will inevitably come.

NEWS TRENDS

- GWL loses 73m gallons daily in Accra due to theft – MD- GBC Ghana
- GWL loses 73 million gallons daily in Accra to theft and Faulty Infrastructure – MD – My Joy Online.
- Cocoa processor's losses deepen to $10.2million – Daily Graphic

Komenda Sugar Factory: Revival with Lessons for Ghana's Manufacturing Future



The government's recent move to inaugurate an Interim Management Committee (IMC) to revive the Komenda Sugar Factory marks a deliberate and strategic step. Rather than rushing to restart production without adequate groundwork, the IMC's mandate to conduct a comprehensive technical, financial, and operational review signals an intent to understand and fix the factory's core challenges before moving forward. This approach reflects a more mature grasp of industrial policy, one that prioritises evidence and accountability.

Komenda's history is a microcosm of Ghana's broader industrial struggles. Commissioned with the hope of producing 125 metric tons of sugar daily and eventually diversifying into ethanol and power generation, the factory instead became a stalled potential. Chronic issues like raw material scarcity, underdeveloped supply chains, weak technical expertise, and inconsistent policy support have prevented the factory from delivering on its promise. Meanwhile, Ghana continues to spend heavily on sugar imports, creating a paradox of idle domestic capacity amid high import bills.

The revival effort offers an opportunity not just to restart Komenda but to redefine Ghana's industrial ambitions. However, this can only be achieved if three critical lessons are applied not only here but across all manufacturing ventures.

Raw material supply must be foundational. Factories do not operate in isolation; they rely on a robust ecosystem. For Komenda, this means revitalising sugarcane farming in the Central Region through sustained financing mechanisms, improved irrigation infrastructure, and guaranteed offtake agreements. Without ensuring a steady flow of quality raw materials, production targets will remain wishful thinking. The government and private sector need to collaborate closely to create a viable outgrower system that incentivises farmers and links them firmly to the factory.

Technical capacity and local expertise must be prioritised. Too often, Ghana's industrial plants rely heavily on imported technology without building local skills to maintain and adapt equipment. This gap undermines sustainability, as technical failures go unresolved and machinery falls into disrepair. The IMC's technical assessment must therefore focus not only on the physical state of the factory but also on developing a local cadre of engineers, technicians, and operators capable of keeping operations running smoothly long term. Partnerships with technical institutions and targeted training programs will be essential.

Execution discipline backed by transparency and accountability is vital. Industrial projects must be managed like businesses with clear milestones, budgets, and public reporting. Past efforts have faltered because timelines were politically motivated and progress was opaque, leading to repeated delays and resource wastage. The government must empower the IMC with the autonomy and resources necessary to deliver tangible results, while ensuring that missed targets come with consequences. This culture of performance management can prevent Komenda from slipping back into the cycle of abandonment.

Beyond these lessons, the Komenda revival must also be understood within the larger context of Ghana's manufacturing and economic transformation goals. The factory's success would not only reduce dependence on sugar imports, which cost the country hundreds of millions annually, but also generate employment and stimulate ancillary industries like transport, packaging, and agro-processing. It could serve as a pilot for how Ghana approaches industrialisation: combining data-driven strategy with realistic timelines, local capacity development, and private sector engagement.

These lessons, though drawn from Komenda's experience, are far from unique to sugar production. They must be applied comprehensively across Ghana's entire manufacturing sector, including agro-processing, textiles and garments, machinery and technology, pharmaceuticals, medicinal herbs, and food supplements. Until the fundamentals of reliable raw materials, strong technical capacity, and disciplined execution are firmly in place, Ghana will struggle to build the sustained and competitive manufacturing value chains it so urgently needs.



Komeda Sugar Factory

This is an opportunity for Ghana to learn from past mistakes and genuinely build a manufacturing sector that can compete globally. The stakes are high: a successful revival would prove that industrial policy can be pragmatic and transformative, while failure risks perpetuating a cycle of costly, unfulfilled ambitions. As the IMC begins its work, stakeholders must remain vigilant and demand progress grounded in data, transparency, and practical realities.

NEWS TRENDS

- Govt inaugurates IMC to revive Komenda Sugar Factory
- Government inaugurates interim committee to revive Komenda Sugar Factory





Mining and Energy Sector in Crisis: The Galamsey Threat to Ghana's Gas Infrastructure and the Promise of rCOMSDEP

Illegal mining (Galamsey) has long been a stubborn problem in Ghana, but recent revelations show it is now threatening some of the country's most critical energy infrastructure. Gas pipelines in the Ashanti and Western regions, vital arteries feeding power plants that sustain industrial and domestic electricity, are increasingly at risk from miners digging beneath or near them. The Board Chairman of Genser Energy, Nana Otwasuom Osae Nyampong VI, sounded a sharp warning[1], miners prospecting under these pipelines are playing with fire, literally. These gas pipelines carry flammable natural gas; careless excavation could trigger deadly explosions, risking lives and causing catastrophic damage to essential infrastructure.

Adding urgency, the CEO of Ghana National Gas Company, Judith Adjobah Blay, confirmed ongoing illegal mining encroachments near the Atuabo-Kumasi gas pipeline[2], highlighting the grave implications for national energy security and community safety. Despite surveillance and community sensitisation efforts, the scale and persistence of galamsey activity demand stronger, coordinated action.

The economic stakes are high. Interruptions or damage to gas supply affect power generation reliability, which cascades into reduced industrial productivity, higher energy costs, and ultimately slower economic growth. Beyond economics, the environmental toll is severe; water bodies are polluted, farmlands destroyed, and landscapes scarred. Alarmingly, many cocoa farmers, faced with the lure of quick gains, are selling their fertile lands to miners, threatening agricultural livelihoods and food security.

Recognising that enforcement alone won't solve this, the government has launched the Responsible Cooperative Mining and Skills Development Programme (rCOMSDEP)[3]. This initiative aims to transition artisanal and small-scale miners from destructive illegal practices into organised cooperatives practising sustainable mining. rCOMSDEP is built on three pillars: responsible cooperative mining schemes, vocational skills training, and environmental restoration. The program's success hinges on genuine community engagement, access to skills and resources, and meaningful incentives for miners to shift towards safer, legal operations.

While rCOMSDEP offers hope, it is not a silver bullet. The enormity of the galamsey challenge demands a multi-sectoral approach: security agencies must protect critical infrastructure, traditional leaders need to champion education and local compliance, and development partners should support economic diversification to reduce mining dependency.

In the meantime, the ongoing risks to gas pipelines underline the precariousness of Ghana's energy future. These pipelines power critical thermal plants, which are central to Ghana's goal of reliable, affordable electricity. The fight against galamsey is thus about more than environmental protection or law enforcement; it is about safeguarding the foundation of Ghana's industrialisation and economic progress.

The warnings from Genser Energy and Ghana Gas are urgent calls for integrated, sustained action that respects both people's livelihoods and the nation's development goals. rCOMSDEP's launch is a positive step toward reining in illegal mining's damage.



Credit :Responsible Cooperative Mining

But to truly "turn waters blue and forests green", as the Lands Minister urged, Ghana must commit to long-term reforms combining enforcement, education, economic alternatives, and strong institutional coordination. Only then can the mining sector be transformed into a catalyst for prosperity and sustainability.

NEWS TRENDS

- Galamsey threaten security of gas pipelines – GBC Ghana.
- Galamsey activities threaten Atuabo pipeline – Ghana Gas Warns – CitiNews.
- Galamsey threatening our natural gas pipelines and communication cables – Genser VP.
- Mining under new gas pipelines dangerous - Genser Board Chair warns galamseyers.

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IMANI Center for Policy & Education is a Think Tank of considerable local and international repute based in Ghana. Founded on the 9th of March 2004, IMANI has carved a niche in Ghana's policy environment for putting out objective, independent analysis and critique on many issues, using tried and tested techniques that apply across different disciplines.

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